532
International Law Studies - Volume 62
The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International Legal Issues
Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore (editors)

NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE ESCALATION
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Forrest R. Frank
The dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations
of the world to international security
have long been recognized by analysts
of political and military affairs. 1 Problems for international security posed by
terrorist acts have also been examined. 2
Recent analysis, however, has focused
on the nexus of these two different
threats to international securityterrorist acquisition and possible use of
nuclear explosive devices, radiological
weapons, or attacks on various nuclear
facilities and installations. 3 Few studies
have examined the problems arising
from incidents of nuclear terrorism,
choosing instead to focus solely on the
feasibility or probability of nuclear terrorism. These studies have resulted in
significant improvements in efforts to

protect physically nuclear materials and
nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly
those under U.S. jurisdiction.4 However, the problem of limiting the escalation of conflict arising from terrorist
acts in which nuclear explosive devices,
radiological weapons, or attacks on
nuclear facilities are employed remains
to be considered. This paper addresses
this problem. Hopefully it will initiate
scholarly discussion and analysis.
Defming Nuclear Terrorism. Nuclear
terrorism can be defined as the
unauthorized use or .attempted use of
nuclear explosive devices, use or
attempted use of nuclear materials, or
attacks or attempted attacks on nuclear
facilities and installations for extortionate purposes. The victim of
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nuclear terrorism may be an individual,
a group of individuals, an organization,
or a government. The primary actor on
whom the burden of response to nuclear
terrorism will fall, however, is the government of a nation on whose territory
nuclear terrorist acts are committed.
Governments rather than individuals,
groups of individuals, or organizations
will assume primary responsibility for
response because of the scope and
magnitude of the effects nuclear
terrorist acts may have on individuals,
property, and the entire fabric of
society.
Four distinct types of nuclear terrorist acts can be considered: overt
threat to use nuclear explosive devices
or radiological weapons, or an overt
threat to attack a nuclear facility; use of
nuclear explosive devices; use of radiological weapons; and attacks on nuclear
facilities housing nuclear weapons,
peaceful nuclear explosive devices,
nuclear fuel cycle processes and materials, or nuclear weapons fabrication
processes and materials.
How likely is nuclear terrorism? The
answer to this question depends on
several factors; however, three factors
seem particularly significant. The first
factor is the amount of expertise needed
to fabricate or otherwise "acquire nuclear
explosive devices or radiological weapons or to attack various nuclear facilities. The amount of expertise needed to
fabricate a nuclear explosive device
varies in inverse proportion to the fissionability of material available. No
expertise is required to assemble a
nuclear explosive device if it can be
stolen intact from the arsenal of a
nuclear weapon state or a state possessing "peaceful nuclear explosive devices." Considerable expertise is necessary to fabricate a nuclear explosive
device from uranium highly enriched in
isotope 235 or 233 or from plutonium.
Vast amounts of expertise as well as
considerable capital equipment and
other economic resources are required

to fabricate natural uranium isotope
238 into a nuclear explosive device.
It is important to bear in mind that a
terrorist trying to construct a nuclear
explosive device does not operate under
the same rigorous performance constraints that bound the efforts of a
military weapon designer. After all, "a
clandestine nuclear bomb maker may
care little whether his bombs are heavy,
inefficient, and unpredictable. They
may serve his purposes so long as they
are transportable by automobile and are
very likely to explode with a yield
equivalent to at least 100" tons of
chemical explosive."s While the amount
of expertise needed to construct a bomb
is perhaps no greater than that derived
from college physics, chemistry, and
perhaps engineering, the amount of expertise needed to construct a simple
device for dispersing radioactive material is even less. Any container capable
of dispensing liquid radioactive waste
under pressure would be sufficient;
pouring liquid or particulate radioactive
materials into air-conditioning systems
of large buildings or into urban water
supplies might also represent highly
effective methods of dispersing some
radioactive materials.
The amount of expertise needed to
attack a nuclear facility depends, in very
large measure, on the kind of facility to
be attacked. Some facilities such as
nuclear weapons fabrication plants are
heavily guarded and would require a
sizable force of terrorists for there to be
much chance of a successful attack.
Other installations such as nuclear fuel
fabrication plants, nuclear power re"actors, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing
centers, critical assemblies used in research, and various installations using
radioisotopes in research, industrial
processes, or medical treatments might
require very little military-type expertise to be successfully overcome.
The second factor bearing on the
likelihood of nuclear terrorism is the
accessibility of nuclear materials to
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potential nuclear terrorists. There are
many radioactive substances that might
be suitable for use as radiological
weapons. These are materials that could
be acquired from scientific supply
houses, industrial materials wholesalers,
and other types of industries catering to
the research, teaching, and quality control market. Most, if not all of these
substances, however, are not suitable for
use in nuclear explosive devices.
There are relatively few materials
that can be taken off the shelf of a
chemical supply house or a nuclear
facy,ity and fabricated into a nuclear
explosive device. Most of these materials
are not widely distributed or used outside the nuclear power or nuclear explosives fabrication industries. These
materials include the following:
uranium enriched to 90 percent in
isotope 235 or 233; plutonium; plutonium nitrate in solution; enriched
uranium isotope 235 hexafluoride; hightemperature, gas-cooled reactor graphite-coated fuel particles; fuel elements
for light water reactors using plutonium;
plutonium oxide and depleted uranium
oxide pellets used as fuel for liquid
metal fast breeder reactors, and critical
assemblies used in physics research on
college campuses and in industry. 6
Most, if not all, of these materials are
regulated by international safeguards
when transferred from a nuclear weapon
state to other states; the U.S. Government also imposes standards of physical
security on installations handling these
materials as well as other materials that
could, with additional processing, be
fabricated into nuclear explosive devices. 7 Other nations employ similar
systems of physical and accounting safeguards to minimize the likelihood of
theft or misuse of these nuclear materials. Limiting access to these materials by various methods significantly
reduces the likelihood that terrorists
will be able to acquire materials which
could be fabricated into a nuclear explosive device. Unfortunately, access to

materials that could be used in radiological weapons is often not well regulated by national or international safeguards. 8
The third factor that figures prominently in calculating the likelihood of
nuclear terrorism is the motivation of
individuals and groups employing terrorist tactics to achieve their political
and/or economic objectives. While our
definition of terrorism has excluded
psychotic or neurotic behavior, deranged individuals might also employ
nuclear explosive devices, radiological
weapons, or attack various nuclear
facilities as a result of their illnesses.
One analyst has prepared a list of
potential terrorists and the motivations
underlying their behaviors:
Possible Malefactors

1. Foreign governments and
their agents, acting under orders.
2. Sub-units of foreign governments and their agents or military forces acting with or without
official sanction.
3. Individuals or groups engaged in domestic subversive activity: extremists, terrorists, nihilists.
4. Criminals-highly organized, loosely associated, or individual.
5. Psychopaths, severe neurotics, and psychotics, harboring
sadistic homicidal, or suicidal
motives.
6. Mercenaries in the pay of
others, or who need the money to
payoff debts, support a heroin
addiction, etc.
7. Disgruntled employees
seeking to sabotage an installation
for revenge, or out of casual vandalism.
Motives for Nuclear Malfeasance

1. International enmity or
rivalry.

535
2. Sectional or factional enmity, such as civil war, terrorism.
3. Desire to create panic or
interrupt electrical power, either
for its own sake or secondary to
some other design, such as looting
under cover of darkness, etc.
4. Desire to establish credibility of later threats of repetition, demands for blackmail payments, etc.
5. Desire to obtain special
nuclear materials for bombs.
6. Desire to obtain radioactive waste materials for terror,
homicide, blackmail, or resale.
Motives 6 and 7 may also subsume
the desire to control such materials in order to secure immunity from persecution or prosecution for the thieves or for
others as stipulated in threats to
the authorities.
7. Sadistic motivationmerely to cause suffering. This
might take the form of a specific
grudge against particular persons
likely to be killed or injured in a
nuclear incident, such as employer, spouse, rival, etc.
8. Suicidal/homicidal motivation-to die spectacularly, take
other lives at the same time.
9. Publicity motivation to get
one's name in the papers, or to
pUblicize some specific cause (a
frequent motive for aircraft hijacking and terrorism).
10. Psychotic motivation. This
can take various forms, depending
on the nature of the delusional
system involved. 9
One might add to this list the theft or
possible use of materials by accident of
opportunity. Clearly, recent experience
in the Middle East, in Northern Ireland,
in Japan, in the United States, in Western Europe, and in Latin America
illustrates the willingness of individuals
to use extreme, extortionate violence to

attain their political and/or economic
objectives.
In calculating the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, at least these three
factors must be simultaneously evaluated. Merely because an individual has
expertise in the design of nuclear explosive devices and may have access to
materials that could be used to fabricate
such a device, he may not be motivated
to become a nuclear terrorist. Indeed, I
suspect that a potential nuclear terrorist
first would consider using nuclear materials or attacking nuclear facilities,
then he would acquire the necessary
expertise to fabricate a nuclear explosive device, construct a radiological
weapon, or attack a nuclear facility.
Finally, he would seek out the appropriate materials to carry out such plans.
Reasonable people may reach different conclusions about the net threat
of nuclear terrorism. Some may conclude that the threat is not very great;
others may conclude nuclear terrorism
is imminent. My own view is that
nuclear terrorism is probably inevitable.
We have already witnessed several terrorist or terrorist related incidents involving nuclear materials.
At least one attempt has been made
to extort money from government
officials by an individual threatening to
destroy a city with a homemade,
thermonuclear bomb. The attempt was
thwarted by good police work, not
because the design of the bomb accompanying extortion notes was considered
defective by government officials. 1 0
Unknown individuals disseminated
radioactive materials normally used in
medicine aboard an Austrian train in
April 1974, causing much concern if not
substantial property damage and casualties among railroad passengers. 11 Concern over possible theft of nuclear weapons has mounted in the United States
over the past few years as various
shortcomings in the physical security of
U.S. nuclear weapons have been revealed. In 1974, reports reached the
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press that a Nike-Hercules antiaircraft
installation outside Baltimore had been
broken into in an apparent attempt to
steal nuclear weapons thought to be
stored at that installation for use in air
defense. 12 During the period,
1973-1975, members of Congress investigated the security of U.S. nuclear
weapons stored overseas. Senator
Symington, commenting on U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Korea, reported
that we "were not being as careful with
our nuclear stockpile in the Far East as
we are in Europe.,,1 3 The European
situation was termed "critical" by
Senators Pastore and Baker in discussions with Defense Secretary Elliot
Richardson upon their return from an
inspection of the U.S. European nuclear
weapons stockpile. 14 While many of
these deficiencies were corrected in the
eyes of critical Senators,! 5 the U.S.
Government intends to continue its
efforts to upgrade the security of nuclear weapons stored at home and
abroad to the tune of $230 million over
the period, July 1975 through September 1977. 16
In addition to these problems, there
have been several known threats against
nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors
or uranium enrichment plants. 17 The
crash of a B-52 bomber some 20 miles
from a nuclear power reactor plant in
South Carolina1 8 raised the specter of a
terrorist flying a "kamikaze" mission
into a nuclear facility. David Krieger
quotes then Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Dr. James Schlesinger, appearing on a radio question-and-answer program, discussing this subject with
typical bluntness and candor:
If one intends to crash a plane
into a facility and one is able to
persuade the pilot that that is the
best way to go, there is, I suspect,
little that can be done about the
problem.
The nuclear plants that we are
building today are designed carefully to take the impact of, I

believe, a 200,000 pound aircraft
arriving at something on the order
of 150 miles per hour. It will not
take the impact of a larger aircraft. 19
Krieger notes that a Boeing 747 "weighs
about 365,000 pounds and travels considerably faster than 150 miles per
hour.,,2o Thus, even nuclear power
plants protected by very strong physical
security on the ground might be vulnerable to air attack by kamikaze pilots or
remotely piloted vehicles.
We have witnessed only a few incidents resulting in minimal property
damage, little loss of governmental prestige, and minimal international conflict.
What will happen, however, if a terrorist
group succeeds in stealing nuclear materials, fabricates a bomb, and actually
detonates it? Furthermore, what will
happen if the terrorists steal materials
from one country, fabricate a bomb in
bases on the territory of a second
country, and detonate the bomb on the
territory of yet a third? What will the
government victimized by a nuclear
terrorist act do? How will other nations
respond to the nuclear terrorist incident
and the countermeasures taken by the
victim government? We turn now to a
consideration of the physical effects and
political consequences of nuclear terrorism.
The Effects of Nuclear Terrorism.
There are several physical effects that
would result from the detonation of a
nuclear explosive device, the dispersal of
radioactive material, or the attack on
various nuclear installations in which
radioactive material was released. Use of
nuclear explosive devices by terrorists
would result in the same types of
damage caused by military use of nuclear weapons. Dispersal of radioactive
material might cause many of the same
problems associated with the effects of
radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests or the long-term
consequences of the use of nuclear
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weapons. Attacks on various nuclear
installations resulting in the release of
radioactive materials might cause a
broad range of physical effects ranging
in severity from little more than small
spills of radioactive material following
accide'nts involving U.S. nuclear
weapons in the midair collision of a
B-52 bomber and a tanker over Spain21
to the kinds of damage envisioned as the
result of a nuclear reactor core meltdown with simultaneous failure of the
emergency core cooling system. 22
Terrorist detonation of a nuclear
explosive device would cause damage
and casualties as a result of four specific
forces: blast, thermal radiation, prompt
nuclear radiation, and long-term nuclear
radiation. Additionally, disruption of
communications and malfunctions of
electronic equipment might occur as the
result of electromagnetic pulse. The
severity of these effects would depend
on a number of factors, including the
following: yield of the explosion; types
of materials used in the fabrication of
the device, height of the device above
ground at the time of detonation; prevailing wind and weather conditions at
the time of detonation and for a period
of hours thereafter; relative hardness of
the target area; and the amount of
relief, rescue, and medical aid immediately available to survivors of blast and
thermal effects. 23
The effects of terrorist use of radiological weapons are far more difficult to
predict. Such effects would depend in
very large measure on the kinds of
radioactive materials dispersed, the pattern of dispersal, and the length of time
individuals are exposed to radioactive
materials. Use of radiological weapons,
in addition to possibly causing casualties, would result in the contamination
of a wide range of physical resources
including land, water supplies, buildings,
and capital equipment. These effects
would also occur as a consequence of
radioactive fallout generated by the
detonation of a nuclear explosive

device. Dispersal of radioactive material
might not cause casualties; however, it
would necessitate expensive, timeconsuming, disruptive decontamination
efforts. 24
Attacks on nuclear facilities intended to cause the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere are
perhaps the most difficult forms of
nuclear terrorism to evaluate in terms
of physical effects. The nature of the
work being carried out at the installation to be attacked, the kind of
materials and processes used in the
facility, the difficulty in bypassing
redundant safety features built into the.
facility, the ability of the facility effectively to contain released radiation
within its physical structures or on the
site, and the degree of physical protectionagainst direct attack are all
important variables that affect the
physical effects of terrorist attacks on
nuclear facilities. While overcoming
these obstacles to the release of radioactive material into the biosphere during
a terrorist act is a major task, Theodore
B. Taylor reminds us that criminals have
been eminently successful in attacking
heavily fortified buildings and vaults in
recent years:
In the last fifteen years more
than two dozen major thefts from
modern alarmed vaults wired
directly to a protective agency
have been reported. Alarm systems connected only to the door
of the secured place have been
circumvented, and comprehensive
alarm systems have been successfully disconnected. Burglars have
used diamond-tipped steel drills,
acetylene torches, twenty-millimeter antitank guns, thermic
lances, explosives, and other
highly specialized equipment to
penetrate cement-filled doors,
steel-reinforced concrete vault
walls, steel vaults, and steel vault
doors as much as two feet
thick. 25
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Taylor argues, in effect, that nuclear
facilities are vulnerable to attack by
highly organized, well-equipped terrorists just as are Brinks armored trucks,
large bank vaults, and other "secure"
installations.
A broad set of qualifications must be
introduced in trying to estimate the
effects of an attack on a nuclear facility
that results in the release of nuclear or
radioactive materials into the biosphere.
The location of the facility in relation
to large concentrations of civilian or
military personnel is obviously important in estimating casualties. The
weather at the time of the incident and
for a period of hours thereafter is also an
important factor. The extent to which
the site of such an attack was cut off
from outside assistance would also
affect the number and extent of casualties, as would the reaction of individuals
displaced by preventative or rescue and
relief efforts. Mass panic arising from
fear, hasty and poorly planned evacuation of areas, unconfirmed rumors, et
cetera, could claim large numbers of
lives through accidents, coronaries, and
the withdrawal of medical services by
overworked, frightened, and perhaps injured medical personnel. 2 6
The ability of terrorists to acquire
and use nuclear explosive devices or
radiological weapons, or to attack
successfully nuclear facilities causing the
release of radioactive material into the
biosphere may lead to wild speculation
about the number of casualties in various scenarios. While numbers are somewhat hard to pin down, there are many
factors which influence the severity of
casualties resulting from blast, thermal
radiation, prompt nuclear radiation, and
long-term radiation. The types of
materials used, weather, distribution of
radioactive materials, length of exposure
to radiation sources, and the reaction of
the victims of nuclear terrorist acts all
bear on the severity of the physical
effects of nuclear terrorism. The physical effects of nuclear terrorism, in tum,

may substantially affect the political
consequences of nuclear terrorism. We
tum now to a consideration of this
aspect of the problems posed by nuclear
terrorism.
The Political Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism. There is a variety of
political consequences arising from incidents of nuclear terrorism that affect
governments of many states in addition
to the government of the state victimized by nuclear terrorist acts. While
the latter is necessarily faced with the
most difficult choices in responding to
and coping with the effects of nuclear
terrorism, a number of factors very
quickly brings other governments into
contact With the political fallout of a
nuclear terrorist act. While the broad
range of specific acts of nuclear terrorism and the incalculable number of
potential targets make it impossible to
detail all the possible consequences of
nuclear terrorism, analysts should try to
understand those types of consequences
or actions that would be particularly
important in controlling the escalation
of international conflict following an
incident of nuclear terrorism.
There are at least four major types of
consequences or actions that merit
attention. First, we should consider how
the government of a victimized state
will react to the nuclear terrorist act.
Second, we should examine how other
states will perceive the victim's actions
and reactions to nuclear terrorism.
Third, we must consider the actions of
the government of the state ravished by
nuclear terrorism toward other states.
Finally, we should contemplate the
broad systemic consequences of nuclear
terrorism for international relations
generally.
The government of a state which is
attacked by nuclear terrorists in any of
the four broad types outlined above is
immediately confronted with several
problems. It must determine if a threat
to use nuclear explosive devices or
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radiological weapons or to attack nuclear facilities is credible, or it must
verify the actual occurrence of a terrorist act. Second, it must identify the
most probable perpetrators of nuclear
terrorism independently of various
claims of responsibility. Third, it must
cope with a variety of domestic problems generated by nuclear terrorism.
Casualties must be treated; the homeless
resettled; property, buildings, capital
equipment, and farmland must be decontaminated; and the faith of citizens
in their government's ability to protect
them must be restored.
The actions taken by the government
of a state ravished by nuclear terrorism
directed solely within its own territory
to cope with nuclear terrorism may
nonetheless precipitate major international crises leading to international
conflict. A number of actions taken in
the absence of confirmation that nuclear terrorist acts have occurred are
ambiguous; given the presence of latent
or manifest conflict between two
nations or two sets of nations, these
actions might be interpreted as preparations for war. For example, evacuation
of cities, censorship of news, drastic
changes in patterns or modes of internal
communication, suspension of regular
commerce, declarations of martial law
or changes in civil police procedure,
limited or general military mobilization,
or redeployment of military forces-inbeing might all be reasonable steps for a
government trying to cope with nuclear
terrorist acts to take. Each of these
measures or a combination of such
measures might also be perceived as
preliminary preparations for war.2 7
This interpretation seems especially
likely in those cases where previous real
or alleged incidents of terrorism have
precipitated reprisals by the victimized
state against its neighboring states or
other states thought to have been
responsible for the initial terrorist
act. 23
The government of a state trying to

cope with nuclear terrorism might also
undertake a variety of nonmilitary and
military measures against one or more
other states. Likely targets of these
actions include states thought to have
supplied nuclear materials to terrorist
groups; states assumed to have harbored
nuclear terrorist groups before and/or
after commission of terrorist acts; states
thought to have supplied nuclear terrorists with nonnuclear supplies, technical resources, expertise, or money. The
government of the victim state might
tum to other states for the extradition
of any individual alleged to have been
involved in the nuclear terrorist incident. States might also seek international cooperation and assistance in
identifying the llources of nuclear materials used in the fabrication of nuclear
explosive devices or radiological
weapons. Claims for indemnification of
individuals, organizations, and governments suffering personal injury and
property loss as the result of nuclear
terrorism might be filed against various
states, including nuclear materials
supplying states as well as nuclear
materials recipient states.
The use of military force in response
to nuclear terrorism by the victim state
cannot be overlooked. Military force
could be deployed against the same
wide variety of states noted above. The
range of military actions that could be
undertaken could vary greatly from
minimum efforts to close the border
between the victim state and its neighbors to more drastic actions. These
actions might include some or all of the
following: interdiction of terrorist infiltration routes; attacks on terrorist base
camps; .embargo or blockade of states
aiding terrorists or permitting terrorists
to operate from their territories; attacks
on the civilian population of other
states roughly equaling the destruction
caused by a nuclear terrorist act;
destruction of other states' nuclear
facilities; or even a full-scale invasion
and occupation of other states in
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reprisal for nuclear terrorism
It is clear that acts undertaken by the
victim state toward other states would
have profound effects on international
order. The military actions described
above would be sufficient to unleash a
major war, depending on the states
directly involved and the strength of
their respective alliance systems. Incidents of nuclear terrorism involving
materials nominally under international
safeguards would. automatically raise
very serious questions about the reliability of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear
materials. IAEA inspection of national
nuclear materials accounts, the primary
safeguard against diversion of nuclear
materials, that fail to detect the diversion of nuclear materials subsequently
thought to have been used in the commission of a nuclear terrorist act may
raise very grave questions about the
entire safeguards system. Such questions
once raised would be very hard to quiet,
hence weakening the IAEA's ability to
perform its critical function of verifying
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.29
Nuclear terrorism may also raise a
number of problems relating to the
obligations assumed by the nuclear
weapon states in their adherence to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation TreatySecurity Council Resolution 255, (19
June 1968). 3 0 The nuclear weapon
states might find themselves in a position of direct confrontation with one
another because of demands on the part
of the government of the state attacked
by nuclear terrorists for assistance.
Furthermore, use of nuclear terrorism
by a group claiming the status of a state,
i.e., a liberation movement, might cause
major political problems.in relations
among the nuclear weapon states, as
well as between the nuclear weapon
states and nonnuclear weapon states.
Successful nuclear terrrorism might
also give rise to more general security
problems without regard to actions
undertaken by the victim state. All

states would become concerned about
nuclear terrorism and might undertake
actions that could easily be misinterpreted by other, potential adversaries.
Successful nuclear terrorism in one part
of the world might be an invitation to
terrorists in other parts of the world to
use nuclear explosive devices, radiological weapons, or attacks on nuclear
facilities as an effective, spectacular
means of achieving political and eco·
nomic objectives. Government leaders
might conceivably be faced with a new
set of dominoes-nuclear facilities,
sources of radioactive materials, or
sources of fissionable materials.
In surveying the political conse·
quences of nuclear terrorism, it becomes
clear that nuclear terrorism creates
problems which, in turn, may be more
destructive over the long term than the
act of nuclear terrorism itself. Initiation
of hostilities between two or more
states as the result of a catalytic nuclear
terrorist act ought to be an outcome
over which great efforts would be expended in an effort to avoid it. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to
the problem of limiting the escalation of
conflict arising from nuclear terrorism.
We now turn to some possible steps that
might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally,
or multilaterally by nations of the world
to avoid the "worst case" outcome of a
nuclear terrorism incident.
Limiting the Escalation of International Conflict Arising from Nuclear
Terrorism Nuclear terrorism can be
analyzed in traditional arms control
terms with considerable improvement in
understanding of the problems to be
solved. The objective in developing
mechanisms to cope with nuclear terrorism is to reduce the likelihood of war
and, failing that, to minimize the effects
of war should it occur.
Nuclear terrorism is an inherently
ambiguous event. Thus, there is a need
for all parties-states, international
organizations, and terrorists-to verify
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many different aspects of terrorism. In
addition to verification, there is a need
to develop a set of incentives and
penalties, as well as a means of enforcing these incentives and penalties to
discourage the escalation of international conflict as the result of a nuclear
terrorist act. There is also a need to
detect attempts to employ nuclear terrorism so that appropriate, nonescalatory countermeasures can be
taken. Let us examine each of these
problems momentarily.
The state attacked by nuclear terrorists has several distinct verification problems. First, it needs to determine
whether or not it is under attack by
terrorists, by unauthorized action by
regular military forces of another state,
or by a clandestine military operation
mounted by another state. The government of the state under nuclear terrorist
assault must also verify the use of
nuclear explosive devices, radiological
weapons, or the successful attack on
nuclear facilities so that it may undertake appropriate decontamination
actions as well as mobilize necessary
medical and relief personnel.
Other states, too, have a vested interest in confirming the identity of
nuclear terrorists. Some states may find
themselves committed to military action
by treaty or executive agreement unless
it can be established that their ally, the
victim of a nuclear terrorist act, is not
under an authorized military assault
from another state. States with nuclear
weapons or peaceful nuclear explosive
devices may also be very concerned
about the identity of nuclear terrorists
as well as the source of nuclear materials
because of their concern about possible
breakdowns in command and control
over their own nuclear weapons.
Potential adversaries of the victim of
nuclear terrorism require verification of
a number of acts. First, they too need
to verify that nuclear terrorist acts are
committed by terrorists and not agents
provocateur on the one hand, or that

alleged nuclear terrorist acts are not
simply a pretext for the victim to
initiate hostilities against one or more
potential adversaries on the other.
Second, potential adversaries of the
victim state need confirmation of
nuclear terr.orism incidents to interpret
what are otherwise ambiguous events in
the victim country. Other countries
neither aligned with the victim or
potential adversaries require verification
of nuclear terrorist acts so that they
may be able to assist in the management
of crises by refusing havens to alleged
nuclear terrorists, providing rescue and
relief supplies and personnel, and
offering their good offices to mediate
disputes arising between the government
of the target state and other states it
feels are responsible for nuclear terrorist acts.
In addition to coping with the problems of ambiguity inherent in real or
alleged acts of nuclear terrorism, in the
domestic responses to nuclear terrorism,
and in the international responses to
nuclear terrorism, attention should be
paid to the development of mechanisms
that militate against both domestic and
international escalation of conflict
arising from incidents of nuclear terrorism. One set of possible remedies addresses some of the underlying motivations for escalation on the part of the
victim state. Another set of possible
remedies looks at the problem of
limiting the scope and magnitude of
escalation in the event of nuclear terrorism.
There are a number of factors that
would tend to encourage the government of a state ravished by nuclear
terrorist acts to lash out at real or
imagined enemies in an effort to cope
with the problems raised by nuclear
terrorism. One of the incentives to
lashing out would be to apprehend and
bring to justice those individuals
directly responsible for nuclear terrorist
acts. An arrangement providing for the
prosecution or extradition for
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prosecution of individuals alleged to
have participated in nuclear terrorism
analogous to the Convention for the
Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft3 1 may be a useful measure in
the management of crises arising from
nuclear terrorism. While this kind or"
guarantee of prosecution may not deter
terrorists, it may discourage states from
kidnapping alleged nuclear terrorists on
the territory of other states and forcibly
returning these individuals to the victim
state for prosecution.* Such actions
might cause very serious problems for
the relations among the states directly
involved in the "forcible extradition" of
alleged nuclear terrorists.
Agreement in some form might also
be reached to provide for the compensation of individuals suffering injury or
property loss as the result of nuclear
terrorism. Such an agreement might
contain a flat limitation of liability
comparable to the Price-Anderson insurance arrangement for the U.S. nuclear industry;32 it might have provisions for sharing of costs among all
nuclear materials supplying and receiving nations. If some mechanism
could be developed to minimize the
financial losses incurred by governments, private citizens, and various economic entities as the result of nuclear
terrorism, the government of the state
injured by nuclear terrorism might be
better able to resist internal public
opinion and bureaucratic pressures to
resort to the use of military force to
redress the grievances of its citizens
against other states.
*The kidnapping and forcible extradition
of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to Israel
in May 1960, resulted in a considerable
increase in tensions between those two states
until August 1960, when the two governments agreed to drop the matter of forcible
extradition. The issue did arise during Eichmann's trial when the defense challenged the
competence of the Israeli court to try Eichmann because of his extralegal extradition to
Israe1. 33

S.ome form of agreement to prosecute or extradite individuals accused of
participating in nuclear terrorism and
another agreement to provide compensation to the victims of nuclear terrorism may take some escalatory pressures
out of nuclear terrorism from the perspective of the victim. Neither agreement, however, will do much to aid in
the verification or detection problems
alluded to earlier. Here, there are some
recent developments worth noting that
augur well for improved international
capability to detect nuclear terrorism.
Earlier in this paper, it was observed
that limiting access to nuclear materials
seemed to be tl).e easiest, surest way to
reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorist incidents. An agreement was concluded among the seven major nuclear
materials supplying nations-the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, Canada, France, and the
Federal Republic of Germany-imposing
a variety of physical safeguards on
nuclear materials supplied to other
states under agreements for cooperation
safeguarded by the IAEA. While the
exact content of the agreement has not
been made public, newspaper accounts
suggest that the kind of physical protection demanded would be sufficient to
improve greatly the likelihood of detecting attempts to steal nuclear materials in transit from supplier to recipient as well as from stockpiles of
materials already in the hands of the
recipient nation. 34
National intelligence networks relying on both national technical means of
verification and a variety of other
human assets and analytical techniques
may be able to aid in the verification of
attempted or successful acts of nuclear
terrorism. 35 The critical problem is the
distribution of intelligence data from
one country to another in a manner that
does not compromise intelligence
sources and methods, but nonetheless
permits all concerned to verify nuclear
terrorist acts, domestic responses to
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such acts, the possible attempt at nuclear terrorism, and other related actions. 36
The use by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) of intelligence data on possible airplane hijackers
provided by member nations may be a
useful model on which to base a similar
scheme of intelligence data sharing.
Apparently, when a national intelligence
organization detects a possible airplane
hijacking attempt, it alerts the ICAO.
The ICAO in turn distributes this information directly to all member
nations. Thus, member states are alerted
to the dangers of airplane hijackings
without anyone nation's intelligence
sources and methods being unduly compromised.3 7
Another possible approach to the
problem of verification of nuclear terrorist acts and various domestic actions
taken by the victim government might
be "verification by challenge" as formulated in the Biological Weapons Convention. 3 1\ There is no formal on-site inspection or other verification of the
destruction or diversion "to peaceful
purposes ... of all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery ... " of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare. 39 However,
there are provisions for verification in
the event a nation believes another is
engaging in questionable acts. Article VI
provides:
(1) Any State Party to this
Convention which finds that any
other State Party is acting in
breach of obligations deriving
from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint
with the Security Council of the
United Nations. Such a complaint
should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as
well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.
(2) Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes to

cooperate in carrying out any
investigation which the Security
Council may initiate in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations, on
the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The
Security Council shall inform the
States Parties to the Convention
of the results of the investigation. 40
Verification by challenge would be particularly useful in better understanding
the actions of the government of the
state trying to cope with the aftermath
of nuclear terrorism. Other states would
already have some information based on
diplomatic reports; verification of
nuclear terrorism by challenging specific
domestic responses would be beneficial
in clarifying ambiguous acts without
necessarily forcing potential adversaries
to take actions which the victim state
would regard as hostile.
Clearly, verification of nuclear terrorism could not be handled exactly the
same way as verification of biological
weapons manufacture or stockpiling.
There would be many objections to the
use of the U.N. Security Council as the
primary investigating organ. Some kind
of ad hoc arrangement drawn from
governments allied with the state victimized by nuclear terrorism, the victim
state's potential adversaries, and states
nominally "nonaligned" in the context
of the possible dispute with technical
support by the International Atomic
Energy Agency's office of the Inspector
General might be a more appropriate
verifying force. However, if the burden
for verifying incidents of nuclear terrorism can be removed from the shoulders
of the victim government and its potential adversaries, the chances of managing
crises successfully are probably enhanced.
There are a number of other areas
that might lead to conflict that will
eventually have to be addressed. Time
and space permit only a cursory
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description of the problems yet to be
addressed.
First, how are nuclear materials recovered from thefts, unsuccessful attempts at nuclear terrorism, et cetera, to
be handled? Who shall pay recovery
costs? Who shall insure that these recovered materials are adequately accounted and safeguarded so that they
do not become the source of second or
third order nuclear terrorist weapons?
Second, how shall existing safeguards
be enforced? The present IAEA safeguards system merely requires that evidence of safeguard violations be presented to the Board of Governors-22
national representatives-who may act
as they deem fit. Might the world be
somewhat better off if a clear schedule
of pena!ties for violation of international· safeguards be established?
Third, what is the future role of the
IAEA to be in any scheme of nuclear
materials safeguarding and the coping
with problems of nuclear terrorism? The
IAEA has become more and more reluctant to take a vigorous leading role in
developing physical security standards,
procedures, and technology, alleging it
lacks the budget and manpower necessary to accomplish these tasks. What
changes, if any, in the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency
might be in order so that it could be a
more vibrant force in helping nations
cope with the aftermath of nuclear
terrorist acts?
Finally, what additional steps should
be taken to enlarge the scope of national and international safeguards on
nuclear materials? Some might argue
that a large number of materials that
could be used in a variety of terrorist
weapons are presently beyond the scope
of national or international safeguards.
Given the magnitude of the risks these
materials pose to international order,
might this be the time to develop
safeguards on radioactive elements used
in industrial research, nuclear
medicine, college teaching, and other

places that might be diverted to terrorist use?
These questions lead us directly to
the need for an agenda of actions that
can be taken over the next few years.
An Agenda for Action. The problem
of nuclear terrorism will go away only
when the more general problem of
terrorism has been solved. Thus, it is
necessary to consider a number of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral steps
that can be taken to minimize the
likelihood of escalation of conflict
arising from incidents of nuclear terrorism.
Clearly, one of the most important
and perhaps most easily accomplished
tasks is to restrict vastly the worldwide
supply of materials from which a fission
nuclear explosive device could be
fashioned until such time as stringent
physical security standards are developed, put in place, and enforced by
suppliers of nuclear materials. The January 1976 agreement referred to above is
clearly a step in the right direction.
Second, I believe there is a need for a
unilateral declaration on the part of the
United States on the seriousness of
nuclear terrorism. Such a statement
should, in my view, include a call for a
policy of "no safe havens" for nuclear
terrorists, preferably to be codified in
an international treaty.
Third, I believe there needs to be a
concerted effort to initiate international
discussions on ways to minimize the
escalation of conflict arising from nuclear terrorism. While the conclusion of
additional agreements providing worldwide communications modeled after the
United States-Soviet "Hot Line Agreement" would be useful, I think it is very
important that we not lose our perspective on technology. Nuclear technology
has a habit of failing; it can be made to
fail. I believe we need to look beyond
technological "fixes" to the problem of
nuclear terrorism and deal with the
"people" problem terrorism implies.
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At the same time, we should be alert
to the dangers some remedies to the
problem of nuclear terrorism may pose
to civil liberties, freedom of information
exchange, and freedom of movement of
peoples across international frontiers. A

balancing of the rights and interests of
many diverse groups must take place;
hopefully it will take place before we
must cope with incidents of nuclear
terrorism that result in severe escalation
of international conflict.
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